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This paper deals with the accuracy of travel demand forecasts among Norwegian road projects. We 
use data collected from tolled roads and toll free roads. The results reveal that while traffic forecasts 
of tolled schemes are fairly accurate, traffic forecasts among toll free roads have a higher degree of 
inaccuracy and are generally underestimated. An explanation for the observed discrepancy between 
estimated and actual traffic among toll free roads is that road planners may have ignored the 
existence of induced traffic and that the standard national traffic growth rates used in the transport 
models has been too low. For tolled roads, an explanation for the higher degree of forecast accuracy 
is that planners over the years have been scrutinized to provide careful estimates. Our 
recommendation is that traffic forecasts provided by planners should constantly be subjected to 
scrutiny by independent consultants before being presented to the decision makers. Aspects that 
need to be specifically examined include: (1) the extent to which a road project may lead to induced 
traffic, (2) the extent to which transport models accommodate appropriate factors and, (3) the extent 
to which forecasts made address uncertainties by providing confidence intervals of estimates. 
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1. Introduction 
Risk and uncertainty are issues of increasing concern in transport planning, and it is generally 
acknowledged that inaccurate travel-demand forecasts represent a major source of risk in the 
planning of infrastructure projects. International experience suggests that bias, or deliberately 
skewed forecasts, may play a role in the planning of road-infrastructure projects and that risks are 
often downplayed. 
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The over- or underestimation of traffic levels can have severe implications. Traffic forecasts are used 
to determine the capacity of transport infrastructure, and inaccurate traffic forecasts can therefore 
result in inefficient and inaccurate sizing of the road. Accurate forecasts are also important from a 
socioeconomic point of view. All road projects in Norway and most other countries of Western 
Europe are subjected to traditional cost-benefit analyses, which rely heavily on the accuracy of the 
forecasts being used. If traffic levels turn out to be significantly lower than estimated, this can affect 
total benefits derived from time savings, reduced accidents or lower vehicle-operating costs. In the 
case of traffic underestimation, the capacity relief on the congested links could turn out to be lower 
than planned. This may distort the social viability of such projects and result in non viable projects 
being implemented. The end result may be inefficient resource allocation. 
For toll projects, the implications of inaccurate forecasts are even more serious. Whether a road 
project can (completely or partly) be financed using tolls or not depends largely on the traffic level 
(i.e., the number of paying vehicles). Thus, in addition to the consequences for toll free roads, toll 
roads on which traffic levels fail to meet expectations also risk financial default. Furthermore, toll 
roads are often financed through non-recourse loans that are secured against future toll revenue only 
and with no other collateral. Bondholders and lenders should therefore require proposed toll roads 
to be subjected to a thorough risk assessment before investing in projects where the repayment of 
loans relies on precise traffic estimates. 
Over the years, several toll projects have experienced financial difficulties due to traffic shortfalls, 
cost overruns and/or increased interest rates. The Ålesund Tunnels project in Norway experienced 
payment difficulties soon after opening in 1987, and the main creditor, Sunnmørsbanken, eventually 
collapsed. Despite a restructuring of the loans, the project was, in effect, bankrupt. The debt 
continued to increase, and when the project finally was terminated in October 2009, the remaining 
debt was still some € 165 million, which had to be covered by the government. To date, however, it is 
the only Norwegian toll project that has gone into default. With over 100 projects financed by tolls, 
the success rate of Norwegian tolling must hence be considered high. Internationally, the Hungarian 
M1/M15 represents a well-known example of overestimation. The project opened on time and 
within budget, but the traffic soon turned out to be only about half of what was projected. As the 
concessionaire relied solely on the traffic revenue, guarantees from both the shareholders and the 
state had to be drawn, and eventually, the concession was nationalised and toll rates halved. The 
shareholders suffered substantial losses and received no compensation (Joosten, 1999). More 
recently, the M6 toll road outside Birmingham, UK, is now being used by less than half the number 
of vehicles for which it was intended, and haulers have called for the road to be subsidised to ease 
congestion on the main M6, which has no tolls (BBC, 2008). 
The aim of this study is to provide new evidence on the magnitudes of traffic forecast inaccuracies 
using Norway as a case study. We provide explanations for the accuracies and inaccuracies and, 
based on these explanations, give recommendations for improving road-forecast practices. The 
differences in the forecast accuracies between toll and toll free road projects are specifically 
examined.  
The paper is organised into the following sections. Section 2 discusses the forecast uncertainties on 
toll roads versus toll free roads. Section 3 presents the data and methodology used in the analysis. In 
Section 4, the results are presented, and in Section 5, some conclusions are drawn. 
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2. Forecast inaccuracies for toll roads vs. toll free roads 
The practice of financing new infrastructure through user fees is increasing worldwide. For roads, 
cost recovery through tolls is becoming ever more common as total tax revenues are often 
insufficient to cover the requisite infrastructure investments. Traffic forecasting is a complex issue, 
and adding tolls to the calculation normally increases the uncertainty of the forecasts. Road users 
respond to tolls in various ways, not all of which are rational, and the models used to forecast traffic 
are not necessarily designed to incorporate these reactions. 
The financial viability of a toll project relies heavily on the number of paying vehicles passing 
through the toll stations, and overestimation of traffic can potentially have severe financial 
implications. Thus, it is expected that planners treat toll projects with a higher degree of caution and, 
even if uncertainties in the estimates cannot be eliminated, use conservative traffic estimates to avoid 
overly optimistic forecasts. 
Forecast inaccuracy is not necessarily a problem. If the errors for various projects are randomly 
distributed around the true mean, there is a possibility that they would cancel each other out for a 
given project portfolio. When the forecasts are systematically biased, however, with averages 
significantly different from zero, perhaps due to over optimism or downright dishonesty on the part 
of the planners, the problem should be taken more seriously. Whereas transport models can be 
improved through increased computing power, improved data quality and other factors, deliberate 
human error is much harder to completely avoid. 
The concept of optimism bias or risk denial has been the focus of several studies by Flyvbjerg (2005) 
and Flyvbjerg et al. (2005, 2006). Based on the data from transport projects around the world, the 
authors concluded that planners in the transport industry do a poor job of estimating demand. For 
roads, the actual traffic was found to be, on average, 9.5% higher than forecasted. The actual and 
forecasted traffic differed by more than ± 20% in over half of the road projects in the sample. Based 
on these rather disappointing results, Flyvbjerg suggested that planners and decision makers should 
take traffic forecasts, especially rail forecasts, which do not properly deal with uncertainty with “a 
pinch of salt” (Forster, 2006, p. 9). Furthermore, Flyvbjerg used these results to make allegations 
regarding the professional honesty (or dishonesty) of the planners and argued that the end result 
was often that the most misrepresented projects were built rather than the best ones (Flyvbjerg, 2007). 
This was opposed by Osland and Strand (2010), who found no general support for the theory of 
strategic misrepresentation and argued that there are other mechanisms at work that could better 
help to explain the variations in the forecast accuracies that were often observed. 
It is often assumed that planners have become better at predicting traffic levels due to improvements 
in transport models and computing power. Flyvbjerg et al. (2006) did not support this proposition. In 
fact, the opposite seems to be the case for Danish road projects, as forecasts there seem to have 
become more inaccurate over time. Odeck et al. (2009), however, reached different conclusions. By 
investigating the accuracies of the national and regional traffic forecasts, they found that the forecasts 
have become more accurate since 2001, when the regional and national transport models were 
improved. Although their findings relate to forecasts at the macro- and regional levels rather than 
project-specific forecasts, it is still of interest to compare their results with ours.  
Traditionally, the studies of forecast accuracy have been based on toll free roads. With the use of toll 
financing increasing, however, toll projects have come under increasing scrutiny, especially from 
credit-rating agencies that routinely gauge the financial viability of such projects on behalf of 
potential investors. Perhaps the first comprehensive study of toll road traffic-estimation performance 
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was conducted by the investment bank JP Morgan (1997), revealing that 13 of the 14 newly 
implemented US toll roads displayed traffic levels below forecasts. In four of the projects, the 
opening-year traffic was 30% below what was expected. The bank concluded that traffic-forecasting 
inaccuracy represents one of the major sources of risk in toll road projects. The credit-rating agency 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) have performed risk studies of the traffic forecasts in toll projects since 2002 
(Bain and Wilkins 2002; Bain and Plantagie 2003; Bain and Plantagie 2004; Bain and Polakovic 2005) 
and reported consistent findings. Their conclusions were that toll projects throughout the world 
suffer from extensive optimism bias and error. The performance of the projects studied ranged from 
actual traffic being only 15% of the forecasts to actual traffic exceeding forecasts by more than 50%. 
From the perspective of potential investors, these results are alarming. Even worse, it is likely that 
Standard and Poor’s sample, like the other samples of misleading forecasts, was biased because the 
toll facilities with a higher credit quality were over-represented. The worst cases of traffic 
underestimation were probably not included in the sample. As stated by Bain and Polakovic (2005, p. 
68): ‘(…) very poorly performing assets will remain under-represented in the sample and the results 
derived from our case studies are likely to be flattered in comparison with average, global toll road 
forecasting performance’. Forecasts for complex road schemes with intricate traffic patterns are hence 
likely to be vague or non existent, making follow-up studies more difficult. 
The concept of demand ramp-up is often considered to be an argument against using the first whole 
year of operation as the basis for measuring the inaccuracy in forecasts because the demand for travel 
often depends on variables that might take years to spread through the system. It may thus take a 
few years before a new road reaches its full traffic potential. In the S&P 2005 study, however, Bain 
and Polakovic (2005) investigated the concept of demand ramp-up and found no such effect, as there 
was no systematic improvement in the traffic forecasting accuracy after Year 1. The underestimation 
of the traffic in Year 1 was likely to persist during Years 2-5, meaning that the forecasts did not 
become more accurate over time. Similar conclusions were reached by Fitch Ratings (George et al., 
2003), who found the actual performance in US toll projects to be heavily skewed downward. 
However, unlike the other studies mentioned above, George et al. found clear evidence of ramp-up 
and that traffic tended to gravitate back towards and even exceed the original forecasts over time. 
Given these rather disappointing results, one might ask why the toll-financing share of total road 
financing annually increases if traffic revenues regularly fail to meet expectations in the first critical 
years of operation. A probable reason is that a high proportion of user-financed projects actually do 
meet expectations. Mauchan and Bates (2007), of the transport-planning consultants Steer Davies 
Gleave (SDG), studied 15 privately funded toll projects and found that the forecasts showed a 
distribution around the expected value, with no evidence of optimism bias. In fact, for the majority of 
the projects, the traffic was within 5% of forecasts, which in many ways is extraordinarily accurate. 
Their sample was small, however, and even included seven shadow-toll projects, making them, in 
effect, toll free projects, so the transferability of the results may be limited. Users do not pay at the 
point of use in shadow-toll projects, and including such projects in a toll road sample could be 
considered dubious. However, Bain (2009b) argued that shadow-toll projects share the same error 
characteristics as traditional toll projects because of the private financing mechanism. The SDG study 
showed, however, that no general conclusions can be drawn regarding the accuracy of traffic 
forecasts for toll roads and that research in the industry would benefit from a more case-specific 
approach, focusing on one country or region at a time. However, the general impression of toll-
project forecasting accuracy is of overestimation. Further examples from the US, Spain and Australia 
(TRB, 2006; Vasallo, 2007; Li and Hensher, 2009 – cited in Bain, 2009b) have all suggested consistent 
over optimism and/or optimism bias of toll road traffic forecasts. 
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Studies of forecast accuracies in toll roads versus toll free roads have been rare to date. However, 
Bain (2009a) provided a comparison of toll and toll free roads based on the data from the S&P studies 
referred to above and the sample presented in Flyvbjerg et al. (2005). The comparison showed that 
the toll roads and toll free roads suffered from the same uncertainties. The forecast distributions for 
the two categories of roads were similar (the same error) but centred around different means; this is a 
sign of potential bias. The traffic on toll roads was found to be generally lower than the forecast, 
whereas the traffic on toll free roads was found to be higher than the forecast. The consequence of a 
similar distribution is that the observed bias can be corrected for, and the potential for error and 
economic losses can be reduced. Thus, there is no evidence to support the theory that forecast error is 
reduced when drivers are not required to pay tolls. Næss et al. (2006) reached the same conclusions 
with similar forecasting accuracy in terms of the absolute error between the two classes of roads.  
The studies cited above show that while traffic on ordinary road projects often turns out to be higher 
than the forecast, toll road traffic is generally overestimated. What these studies have in common 
though, is that the data often have been collected from secondary sources and from different 
countries on different continents. Some observations even date back decades. Given that different 
countries inevitably have different planning traditions and tools and place different emphasis on 
forecasting accuracy, we argue that the conclusions reached should be interpreted with care. A data 
set from one country and one data source only would, in our opinion, yield much more reliable 
results due to the greater opportunity for quality control of the data. Accordingly, the focus of this 
study is the accuracy of travel-demand forecasts for Norwegian road projects. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The data for this study consisted of observations from 25 toll projects and 25 toll free road projects in 
Norway. The data from toll projects are often more available and generally of better quality than for 
other road projects because all toll projects require a specific approval from the Norwegian 
parliament. The parliamentary bill in which the project is presented includes all financial 
assumptions, including the forecasts for the average annual daily traffic through the toll stations. The 
critical test for traffic forecast accuracy is thus how the actual traffic relates to what was presented to 
decision makers at the time of the decision to build. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration 
(NPRA) collects data annually on the traffic levels, costs and revenues in all toll projects throughout 
the country. The data set includes 12 fixed-link crossings (bridges and tunnels), 11 ordinary highway 
projects and 2 toll cordons. The tolling in the projects started in the years 1990 to 2007. In projects 
where the traffic patterns were difficult to forecast, the data are often unavailable. This is consistent 
with the sampling bias that was observed in the studies mentioned above. 
Although our sample consisted of relatively few observations, we still consider it to be representative 
of the population. During the years 1990 to 2007, 33 toll projects were implemented. Thus, our 
sample comprised 76% of the total projects in the analysed period. The criteria on which the 
sampling was based were data availability and quality. We acknowledge that using the projects 
where data was not available or of a sufficiently high quality for inclusion in the data set would 
increase the precision in the various property estimates of the population. However, due to the high 
sample/population ratio and the fact that the quality of the observations was considered to be very 
high, we still expected to be able to draw some valid conclusions regarding the accuracy of the 
forecasts in the Norwegian toll road industry. 
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An important distinction between toll projects and toll free projects is that paying traffic will always 
differ from (and be lower than) ordinary traffic because of various discounts and exceptions. 
However, given that the information on the fare and discount system was known before the start of 
the project, we still expected planners to be able to estimate their effects with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy.  
For the toll free projects, the data situation was somewhat more complicated. Although these projects 
are approved by parliament in the same way as the toll projects, less data are presented to the 
decision makers, and the quality of post opening data are generally less reliable. However, the 
parliamentary bill includes the net present value (NPV) estimated in the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
that relies heavily on the forecasted traffic levels. To find the original estimates, we thus had to 
consult the original CBAs in which the NPV estimates presented to the decision makers were found. 
The previous CBAs were not stored in a single database, and even when the estimates were present, 
they were often on an overall level, so access to the original detailed calculations was necessary. In 
the Norwegian case, impact assessment, including CBA, is carried out by use of the EFFEKT 
software. This was a rather demanding process and required collecting data from several sources. 
The next step was determining the actual traffic. The NPRA collects traffic data from 9,000 sites on all 
roads based on permanent and temporary monitoring. Among these, 600 sites are so-called Level 1 
sites where the traffic is counted continuously. Unfortunately, no system is in place that requires 
traffic data to be automatically collected on new roads. This means that traffic data were not 
available for several new roads and could not be included in our data set. We were nevertheless able 
to find 25 toll free roads where both reliable estimates and actual traffic levels were available. The 
data were from the years 2001 to 2007 and consisted primarily of projects outside the major urban 
areas. We often found that less emphasis was placed on traffic forecasts for small road projects such 
as the straightening of curves. The sample thus consisted mainly of larger projects. 
3.2 Methodology 
To estimate the accuracy of the traffic forecasts, we compared the actual traffic with forecasted 
values: 
ffa XXXU /)100)((   
where U is percent inaccuracy, aX is the actual traffic and fX is the forecasted traffic. With this 
estimation, perfect accuracy is indicated by zero, and for example, -20% would imply that the actual 
traffic was 20% lower than expected. For forecast values, we used the estimated traffic in the first 
calendar year of operation. This is normally presented in the parliamentary bill where the decision to 
approve the project is made. This means that if a project opens for traffic in August, the basis for 
comparison would be January to December the next year. In addition, we examined Years 3 and 5 to 
test whether any improvement in the forecast accuracy occurred over time. One might argue that 
focusing merely on the first year of operation does not allow for the long-run nature of many 
forecasting models. However, the principles of discounting suggest that the first years of operation 
are crucial for both financial and social viability. If a toll project with a pay-off period of 15 years fails 
to meet revenue expectations in the first five years, the risks of default increase considerably, even if 
the forecasts become more accurate in, for example, 8–10 years. 
It is probably unreasonable to expect planners to be able to predict values with perfect accuracy, 
especially for projects with complex traffic patterns. However, no acceptable level of forecasting 
accuracy is defined, and it must thus be regarded as an empirical matter. For construction costs, the 
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Ministry of Transport and Communications requires cost estimates to be in the range of ±10%; with 
no specific requirement for demand-forecast accuracy, we used this as a benchmark and regarded the 
demand estimates that were within ±10% of the actual traffic to be within an acceptable range. 
4. Results 
The purpose of this study was to assess divergences between the forecasted and actual traffic for toll 
and toll free projects and to investigate whether there were differences in the forecast accuracies for 
the two types of projects. In this section, we present the results of our findings.  
4.1 Forecast accuracy: Toll roads 
As with the international studies referred to above, we found the forecasted traffic on Norwegian toll 
projects to be higher than the actual traffic. However, with the actual traffic being 2.5% less than 
forecasted on average, the scale of overestimation was much less than that revealed in the studies in 
other parts of the world. Summary statistics for the forecast inaccuracies with the Norwegian toll 
projects are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary statistics for forecast inaccuracies for toll roads. 
  Statistic 
Number of cases 25 
Mean -2.5 
Std. error of mean 4.4 
Standard deviation 22.0 
Minimum -35.2 
Maximum 45.0 
 
These results appear to be encouraging. A mean of -2.5% was well within what we defined as an 
acceptable range. However, a closer look at the data revealed that a majority of the projects 
experience traffic overestimation, as in the international studies reported above. Additionally, 24% of 
the projects had over 20% less traffic than expected. Clearly, a traffic overestimation of up to 35% in 
the first whole year of operation can potentially have severe financial implications for the viability of 
a project. There is a significant risk that projects with traffic shortfalls of this magnitude could 
experience financial difficulties that necessitate loan refinancing, a prolonged payment period, 
increased tolls or a combination of alternatives. Luckily, the Norwegian economy has been blessed 
with the rare combination of high economic growth and low interest rates for some time. If this were 
to turn into a recession with increasing interest rates and demand shortfalls, as seen in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the risk of default would increase considerably. The standard deviation was 22%, 
indicating a rather large variation between the projects. Table 2 provides the distribution of projects 
by percentage inaccuracy.  
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Table 2. Distribution of projects by percentage inaccuracy. 
  Number of projects Percentage 
Projects with overestimation larger than -20% 6 24.0 
Projects with overestimation 0 to -20% 10 40.0 
Projects with underestimation 0 to +20% 5 20.0 
Projects with underestimation larger than +20% 4 16.0 
Total 25 100.0 
 
A histogram showing the distribution of these observations is provided in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Inaccuracies of the toll road traffic forecasts. 
 
Figure 1 reveals a curve that is close to a normal distribution. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of 
normality (D(25) = 0.159, p > 0.15) confirmed that the forecasts for the traffic levels in the Norwegian 
toll projects were normally distributed around the mean or that the assumption of a normal 
distribution was not rejected. A t-test for deviation from zero revealed a test statistic of -0.57 and a 
significance value of 0.58, which meant that the mean forecast inaccuracy was not significantly 
different from zero and that we could not conclude that the underestimation was more common than 
overestimation for the Norwegian toll roads. 
From a credit perspective, it is worrying that the majority of the forecast errors for Norwegian toll 
projects were overestimations. However, a toll project can sometimes struggle to reach its full traffic 
potential in the first whole year after opening. This could potentially mean that the overestimation is 
more severe in Year 1 than in subsequent years and that the traffic better fits the forecasts as time 
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progresses. The international evidence of ramp-up has been inconclusive, as different studies have 
shown different results. However, as shown in Table 3, even though the number of observations 
decreased over time (N = 22 in Year 3 and N = 19 in Year 5), there were signs of ramp-up in the 
Norwegian toll projects.  
Table 3. Demand ramp-up. 
Year since opening Mean inaccuracy Std. dev. 
Year 1 -2.5% 22.0% 
Year 3 -2.1% 20.0% 
Year 5  2.3% 23.2% 
 
Although the traffic in Year 1 was overestimated, it increased over time, and after five years, the 
average traffic exceeded the original forecasts. Although the financial implications of forecast error in 
Year 1 might be severe, there is less need to worry if the traffic soon increases to or even exceeds the 
necessary levels. This is contrary to Bain’s (2009b, p. 37) claim that “…projects that under perform in 
their early years may never catch up with their original forecasts in later years”. In our sample, 
among the 13 projects with an overestimation greater than the sample mean, four exceeded their 
original forecasts, five exhibited traffic growth that may well soon put them in the above-forecast 
figures and four continued to under perform at Year 5. From a financial perspective, the failure to 
meet revenue predictions in the first five years of operation is, of course, potentially alarming, but 
our results nevertheless provide a more nuanced picture than that painted by Bain.  
4.2 Forecast accuracy: Toll free roads 
For the toll free roads, for which we had 25 reliable observations from the last nine years, we noted 
that the traffic was, on average, higher than forecasted. The mean underestimation was 19.0%, but the 
range was large, from -14.6% to +76.1%. This was consistent with the pattern observed by Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2005) and Næss et al. (2006). Only six projects had traffic levels below the forecasts, and 13 
projects exhibited traffic overestimation above the sample mean. In seven projects, the actual traffic 
was over 30% higher than predicted. This is clearly unacceptable. We would expect the forecast 
accuracy to be higher for toll free roads, but this was not the case for the Norwegian roads. The 
picture that emerged was that the traffic forecasts for the toll free Norwegian roads were skewed to 
the right. The summary statistics for the toll free roads are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary statistics for the forecast inaccuracies for toll free roads. 
  Statistic 
Number of cases 25 
Mean 19.0 
Std. error of mean 4.1 
Standard deviation 20.5 
Minimum -14.6 
Maximum 76.1 
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Despite a high standard deviation, we found that the mean was significantly different from zero at 
the 99% level (t(24) = 4.64, p < 0.05). Thus, we concluded with a high level of certainty that the traffic 
on toll free Norwegian roads has been underestimated. The spread in the distribution was 
alarmingly high, which indicated a high level of general error. The shape of the distribution, as 
illustrated in Figure 2, indicated that the observations were normally distributed around the mean 
but with a slight positive skew (Kolmogorov-Smirnov: D(25) = 0.098, p > 0.20). 
As illustrated by the standard deviations for both classes of roads, the internal variations with both 
the toll and the toll free projects were huge. However, the difference in the means between the two 
categories of roads was -21.5, and a t-test of the difference revealed that the difference in the mean 
forecast accuracy between the two categories was highly significant and not a result of coincidence 
(t(48) = -3.58, p <0.01). 
 
 
Figure 2. Forecast inaccuracies for the toll free roads. 
 
4.3 Do planners get it right? 
Our results suggest that the Norwegian transport planners should not be satisfied with the accuracies 
of their forecasts. On average, the planners do not get it right even if the toll road forecasts were, on 
average, within an acceptable range. Here, the results presented by Flyvbjerg (2005) and Bain (2009a) 
were confirmed because the toll road forecasts were more accurate than the forecasts for the toll free 
roads and because the countries with more toll road experience produced more accurate forecasts. 
However, the ranges that both the toll roads and toll free roads forecasts fell within were alarmingly 
high and should be a cause for concern. 
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The traffic on toll free roads was significantly higher than forecasted. This is worrying and would be 
doubly disturbing in a situation where the road capacity was limited and where the motivation for 
new road construction was to relieve congestion. But this is usually not the case in countries where 
the congestion is still limited to the peak-period traffic in the large cities. The higher traffic levels will 
often, as argued by Kjerkreit and Odeck (2009), lead to a higher NPV than originally estimated. 
However, this is obviously not a satisfactory situation in the long term. If the traffic is generally 
underestimated, then this could lead to inefficient resource allocation or the implementation of the 
wrong projects and a shorter relief period from congestion for the roads in urban and congested 
areas.  
Transport models for the Norwegian roads sector have improved since 2001, when regional transport 
models replaced a wide range of locally developed models, and Odeck et al. (2009) claimed that the 
forecasts have since improved. Today, the traffic on ordinary toll free roads is estimated through the 
use of national transport models for trips longer than 100 km and regional transport models for trips 
shorter than 100 km. Both models are traditional four-step models based on the fixed-trip matrix 
approach. Induced traffic is thus not taken into account. The traffic on toll roads, however, is 
estimated using elasticity models where the effects of tolls are calculated specifically. Hence, there 
are two different models used, one for toll roads and one for toll free roads.  
The use of the regional transport models has made it possible to identify the factors that lead to 
inaccurate forecasts. If the distributions of the forecasts between regions are similar, it is easier to 
isolate the cause of the error if the forecasts have been based on the same models than if different 
models have been used. Thus, it was interesting to test whether the assumption of increased accuracy 
after the introduction of regional transport models holds true using the data to which we had access. 
The toll road sample included 13 projects implemented in the years 1990 up to and including 2000 
and 12 projects implemented in the years 2001–2007. For the toll free roads, we had 13 projects from 
2001 to 2004 and 12 projects that opened for traffic in the years 2005–2007. Table 5 shows the 
differences in the mean accuracy for the two time periods for the two road categories. The number of 
observations is so low that caution should be taken when interpreting the results, but there appears 
to have been little or no improvement in the forecast accuracy over time either for the toll roads or 
for the toll free roads. However, the weaknesses in the Norwegian transport-demand models were 
first identified in the work leading up to the National Transport Plan for the years from 2002 to 2011, 
and because the planning process for roads often takes years, it has not been until very recently that 
we can expect to see real improvements caused by the improvements in the transport models. 
Table 5. Traffic-forecasting inaccuracies over time. 
Road category/opened for traffic Mean inaccuracy 
Toll roads 1990–2000 -2.7% 
Toll roads 2001–2007 -2.2% 
Toll free roads 2001–2004  18.6% 
Toll free roads 2005–2007 19.4% 
  
The concept of induced traffic is often used to explain traffic levels in excess of what was originally 
predicted. A study by Goodwin (1996) found the traffic in 151 UK highway schemes to be 10% higher 
on average than the forecasts in the short term and 20% higher in the long term. Thus, the forecasts 
for these projects were not able to fully include the extra traffic created by the network 
improvements leading to retiming, redistribution, mode shifting or change of frequency. Goodwin 
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also suggested that the addition of the capacity itself, regardless of the changes in the travel time, 
could help explain the increases in traffic flow. However, the changes in traffic brought by the 
improvements in the pleasantness of travel, such as a smoother ride from better surfaces, remains an 
under-researched area (Goodwin and Noland, 2003).  
Traditionally, transport planning has been based on the traffic levels and independent of the supply 
conditions and the quality of the road network. The growth demand has been largely attributed to 
economic factors such as income, population growth, the prices of petrol and other input factors. 
This is normally referred to as the fixed-trip matrix approach and is still in use in Norwegian road 
planning (except for the straight-crossing projects). Because the traffic on toll free roads is generally 
higher than forecasted, there are indications that this approach should be abandoned and that the 
induced traffic should be dealt with explicitly.  
Another potential explanation for higher traffic levels than estimated is the long period of economic 
growth that Norway has experienced over the last decade. Because transport is a derived demand, 
forecasting traffic relies on the forecasts of a range of other parameters (Boyce and Bright, 2003). 
Thus, if the income estimates in the transport models are underestimated, traffic may also be 
underestimated. The same pattern was observed during the 1990s, when the average national traffic 
growth over the years 1992–2002 was higher than all the forecasts that had been produced (Larsen et 
al., 2004). The recession early in the decade was followed by an economic boom that was 
accompanied by strong traffic growth. De Jong et al. (2003) distinguished between input uncertainty, 
or difficulties in producing good forecasts for transport model input variables, and model 
uncertainty. Because Norway has experienced unprecedented, strong economic growth over the last 
decade, there are clear indications that while more emphasis has been put on improving the 
transport models, the main causes of the observed error are input error rather than model error. This 
fits well with the observations of Larsen et al., who found the standard national traffic growth rate, 
which has been a mandatory input in the transport models, to be too low. 
Strategic behaviour and bias are often cited when no other explanations for forecast inaccuracy can 
be found. Wachs (1987, 1989) argued that because planners are concerned with having their projects 
financed and built, they deliberately produce overly optimistic forecasts for both capital costs and 
traffic. Because governments operate under budget constraints, the projects compete with each other 
for funding. Planners could thus be tempted to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits to 
meet a specific benefit-cost ratio (BCR) cut off. Although intuitively appealing, we do not necessarily 
agree that this serious allegation can be used as a general explanation for traffic-forecast inaccuracy. 
First, our results showed no evidence of such behaviour, which in itself was an indication that these 
forces are not occurring in Norway. Second, as the traffic on ordinary roads was underestimated, the 
benefits were also underestimated and not overestimated, all other things being equal (Kjerkreit and 
Odeck, 2009). In uncongested conditions, traffic in excess of what was forecasted will increase the 
overall benefits, and planners will thus have little to gain from underestimating the traffic, as this 
would mean presenting projects with a lower NPV than what they later turn out to produce. In fact, 
the funding for Norwegian road projects does not always rely on a positive BCR at all. Odeck (1996, 
2010) studied whether Norwegian decision makers’ ranking of road projects was explained and/or 
positively influenced by a positive BCR. Contrary to expectations, he found that the BCR was not a 
significant explanatory variable for the selection of projects and that more emphasis was placed on 
non monetised impacts. The projects with a positive BCR were sometimes not put on the priority list 
at all, whereas the projects with a negative BCR were sometimes given a very high ranking. Nilsson 
(1991) found similar results in Sweden. Although clearly unsatisfactory from a socioeconomic point 
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of view, placing less emphasis on socioeconomic profitability and monetised impacts could reduce 
the risk of optimism bias in producing the traffic forecasts. 
We do acknowledge, however, that the bidding process by which the toll road contracts are awarded 
may play a role in explaining the optimism bias. As argued by Flyvbjerg (2005), Vasallo (2007) and 
Bain (2009b), awarding toll road contracts based on a bidding process where the bidder with the 
highest revenue projections or the lowest capital cost projections wins could reward over optimism 
rather than accuracy. Here, the Norwegian framework for toll financing provides an alternative 
framework that might reduce the risk of overoptimistic forecasts. Norwegian toll projects are 
initiated locally, usually because much-needed road investments cannot be realised in the near future 
within the government budget. The proposal is then evaluated by the NPRA, who closely scrutinises 
all major assumptions before it is forwarded to the Ministry of Transport, which prepares a bill to be 
tabled in Parliament. The project might have a positive or a negative NPV, but all toll projects are 
stress-tested for financial robustness to ensure that the risk of financial default is low, even in worst-
case scenarios. Once passed by Parliament, the operation of the toll road is managed by a non profit 
toll company operating as a financial vehicle on behalf of the NPRA, which remains the ultimately 
responsible party for the project (for a detailed presentation of the organisational framework of 
Norwegian tolling, see Welde and Odeck, 2009). Although the system is not without its flaws, there 
is less incentive for appraisal optimism than in alternative frameworks, and the system of quality 
control and the emphasis on conservative estimates has so far prevented any major financial scandals 
in the Norwegian toll road industry. 
The absence of any major scandals due to inaccurate traffic forecasts should not, however, lead us to 
conclude that this is not an area that warrants continuous attention. The huge variation in  
forecasting accuracies continues to be a major source of risk in the planning of Norwegian road 
projects. However, merely pointing out the problem will not make it disappear. The increasing range 
of international studies focusing on this issue has apparently not contributed to any major 
improvements in terms of forecasting accuracy. However, the knowledge generated from studies 
such as this will hopefully facilitate learning and lead to improvements in the forecasting 
methodologies. Furthermore, we strongly suggest that that the fixed-trip matrix approach (i.e., 
assuming a zero elasticity of demand) be abandoned for all road projects, as this is very likely a cause 
of the poor estimation of traffic levels and, ultimately, total economic benefits. In addition, because 
the process of project bidding or requiring projects to pass a certain BCR threshold to receive 
financing clearly increases the risk of deliberate over optimism, a system where NPV/BCR is only 
one input variable in the decision-making process should be considered. It would be interesting to 
see if countries that apply alternative appraisal frameworks, such as Multi-Criteria Analysis suffer 
from the same inaccuracies as countries where the decision makers’ preferences are more determined 
by the outcome of the traditional cost-benefit analysis. Finally, the signs of good practices should act 
as encouragement and as an incentive for further research into why some projects are more 
successful than others. 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we examined the accuracy of traffic forecasts made in the Norwegian road sector. Two 
types of road projects were studied and compared: (1) toll roads and (2) toll free roads. This 
distinction was made because the consequences of inaccuracy with toll projects are considered to be 
more serious because they may lead to financial difficulties and the bankruptcy of toll companies. 
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We found that the traffic forecasts in the Norwegian toll projects have been fairly accurate. A likely 
explanation is that the planners over the years have been scrutinised and pressed to provide careful 
estimates for these projects. The results prove that the planners have been careful, but the number of 
projects where the actual traffic was significantly below what was forecasted suggest that the toll-
project traffic forecasts should continue to be closely scrutinised. However, the variation in the 
forecast accuracies was high, and we suggest that the results from this study be used to identify the 
causes of why some projects have performed better than others. For the toll free roads, the results 
showed a clear underestimation of the traffic. Some of the projects studied had underestimations so 
great that there is reason to suspect that the projects may have experienced induced traffic for which 
the planners failed to account. This underestimation may have lead to inefficient resource allocation. 
Thus, the decision makers may have been misled into foregoing projects that were beneficial in 
favour of less beneficial ones.  
The results from the Norwegian road sector are slightly better than some of those presented in 
studies from other countries, especially for the toll roads, where the actual traffic was, on average, 
very close to the forecasted traffic. Even though the number of projects with traffic levels 
significantly different from the forecasts was high, the mean forecast accuracy and the relatively high 
share of projects with traffic levels close to perfect accuracy is a source of some encouragement.  
Our findings should be of interest to planners and policy makers in Norway and elsewhere. First, the 
planners need to reconsider their traffic-forecasting models, at least for the toll free projects, to ensure 
that all relevant factors are captured and forecast inaccuracy thus reduced. Second, the issue of 
induced traffic in particular must be considered. The Norwegian models for traffic forecasts do not 
consider induced traffic explicitly, and this may well be a reason why underestimation is prevalent. 
Third, with the high uncertainty revealed in such a crucial variable as the traffic level, presenting 
decision makers with single-point estimates for the NPV might potentially be misleading. This 
suggests that the presentation of social surplus through the NPV should be done through a 
confidence interval illustrating the inherent uncertainty in a project evaluation. Finally, the care taken 
when estimating traffic in toll projects demonstrates good practice but, even here, there is a potential 
for improvement. 
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